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IMAGINE THERE's No MARRIAGE
By Patricia A. Cain*
I. INTRODUCrION
Most of the participants in this symposium begin with the assump-
tion that same-sex marriages will be recognized in Hawaii,' or perhaps
in some other state.2 For them the legal question is: must the other
forty-nine states recognize a same-sex marriage that is legal in the first
state?
I begin with a different question: why should any state recognize
marriages between any two persons? And to analyze this question, I
ask the reader to engage in a different assumption: imagine there's no
marriage. And "no religion too," I am tempted to say just to complete
the parody of John Lennon.3 However, I do not really wish to imagine
no religion. I only wish to imagine no civil marriage. In my imaginary
world of no marriage, religious marriages would continue totally apart
from the state, as they do now, and as they would be constitutionally
required to do in a world without state-recognized marriage.
Lawyers have made two basic legal arguments4 in support of ex-
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. I am grateful to Jean Love for her comments on
an earlier draft of this article and to Jill Krueger for timely research assistance.
1. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the state's refusal to recog-
nize same-sex marriages is a form of sex discrimination that can only be justified by a compelling
state interest under the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution). On December 3,
1996, Judge Kevin Chang issued an opinion holding that the State of Hawaii had failed to carry
its burden of proof and that the sex-based marriage classification was thus unconstitutional on its
face. Judge Chang enjoined the state from refusing to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Dec. 3, 1996). Judge Chang's
order has been stayed pending appeal by the state.
2. See Lisa M. Farabee, Marriage, Equal Protection, and the New Judicial Federalism: The
View from the States, 14 YALE LAW & POL. REV. 237, 285 (1996) (suggesting that the State of
Washington might be "an ideal site for future challenges" to the ban on same-sex marriage).
3. "Imagine there's no countries, It is not hard to do, Nothing to kill or die for, And no
religion too." See John Lennon, Imagine, on IMAGINE (ATV Music Corp. 1971).
4. Cases in which these arguments were raised include Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971); Jones v. Halahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. CL App. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187 (Wash. CL App. 1974); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). Note that
Singer v. Hara included an argument that the marriage laws violated the Equal Rights Amendment
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tending marriage to same-sex couples:
1. The equality argument - Current law restricts marriage to opposite
sex couples. To deny same-sex couples the same, or even similar mar-
riage rights, is to discriminate against them, i.e., to treat them unequal-
ly. Such unequal treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment unless the state can show that the unequal
treatment is justified.
2. The fundamental rights argument - Courts have recognized that "the
right to marry is of fundamental importance. '6 When the state burdens
a fundamental right, as it does when it denies the right altogether to
gay men and lesbians who wish to marry their same-sex partners, it
must show a compelling reason for its action.
Baehr, the Hawaii same-sex marriage case, is an equality case.7
There are two ways to create equal access to marriage: (1) let everyone
in, or (2) keep everyone out. For obvious reasons, the legal battle has
been over the first option; let everyone in. In the real world, no state is
about to abolish marriage completely. However, for purposes of theo-
rizing, it is useful to focus on the second option. When trying to under-
stand what marriage is or should be, a good starting point is to imagine
a world with no marriage.
I am not the first scholar to focus on a world with no marriage.
Martha Fineman, a feminist legal scholar who focuses on the relation-
ship between the state and family, has suggested that we abolish mar-
riage.' In her view, state policies that privilege adult sexual bonds are
not justified. Rather, the state should privilege family relationships of
dependency, in particular the mother-child bond.
Other feminist theorists have criticized the lesbian and gay fight
for equal marriage rights by posing similar questions.9 Why should the
state privilege some adult dyads but not others? Why should the state
of the State of Washington.
5. The equality argument can be made one of two ways: (1) the marriage laws deny equali-
ty (See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44; Singer, 522 P.2d at 1187), or (2) the marriage laws deny equality
on the basis of sexual orientation. Since sex discrimination, the stronger legal argument is that
marriage laws discriminate on the basis of sex.
6. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
7. 852 P.2d at 67 (holding that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage).
8. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEuTERED MOTOR, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURy TRAGEDIES 4-5 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 LAW &
SExuALrrY 31 (1991); Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA.
L. REv. 1535 (1993).
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privilege only dyads? Why not triads? In other words, what business
does the state have in deciding which adult personal relationships are
deserving of legal protection and benefits and which are not?
I presume that a world with no marriage would satisfy these crit-
ics. People could choose their intimate associations or could choose to
avoid intimacy altogether. They could choose their living arrangements,
with intimates, friends, or alone-and the state would take no notice
and make no distinctions. People could get married in their communi-
ties or in their churches by the twos, threes, or fours. Gender, race,
age-none of these things would matter to the state-only to the rele-
vant community or church. Marriage would mean whatever the com-
munity or church said it meant.
In such a world, I pose two questions. One is purely legal: is state
recognition of adult sexual bonds, marriage as we know it, constitution-
ally required? That is, if all states abolished marriage tomorrow, would
a couple who wished to be civilly married have a claim that the state
had deprived them of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment? In
particular, would such state action be a violation of substantive due
process?
The second question is a policy question: would it be sound policy
to remove the state from the marriage game? For example, if there are
valuable benefits that the state derives from recognizing marriage as a
legal institution, then it would be in the state's interest to determine
which adult sexual bonds ought to be recognized and thus privileged in
some way. In our existing world, the real world of marriage, civil
marriage is used as a bright line to determine appropriate state action
toward couples. My question is: when, if ever, should it be a bright
line?
In Part II of this essay, I will address the first question: is state
recognition of the marriage relationship constitutionally required? In
Part El, I provide a brief sketch of what the world would look like if
the state did abolish civil marriage. In Part IV, I focus on some of the
familiar benefits that the state provides married couples and analyze
whether they should continue in a world without marriage. If they
should continue, as I conclude they should, then, absent marriage, the
state must create new methods of determining which couples receive
which benefits. In conclusion, I argue that, although the right to marry
may not be guaranteed as a positive right under current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, marriage is clearly useful to the state and thus ought to
be recognized.
19961
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II. Is STATE RECOGNITION OF THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED?
In this section, I will describe fundamental rights jurisprudence
and analyze how it applies to the right to marry. I will then develop the
argument that marriage, except to the extent that it is a negative liberty
right, need not be affirmatively recognized by the state. I will conclude
that under current law, marriage can be abolished so long as intimacy,
a negative liberty, is protected.
A. Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence
The Bill of Rights guarantees certain individual rights, e.g., speech
and religion, by limiting governmental infringement of those rights.
These explicitly guaranteed rights are often described as "fundamental
rights." When the government goes too far and either denies the right
or substantially burdens it,I  then courts will apply heightened scrutiny
in following the constitutionality of the governmental action. Typically,
if an explicit fundamental right has been infringed, the government
must show that its action was "narrowly tailored" to accomplish a
"compelling state interest."" If the government fails to carry this bur-
den of proof, then the governmental action will be ruled unconstitution-
al.
In addition to the explicitly guaranteed rights of the first eight
amendments, the Court has recognized several implied rights as "funda-
mental" and thus also deserving of heightened scrutiny. These implicit
rights include the right of privacy, 2 the right to vote, 3 and the right
to interstate travel. 4 The right to marry has also been described as a
"fundamental right."' 5 These implicit fundamental rights are viewed as
10. Many governmental actions affect fundamental rights, but do not trigger heightened
scrutiny. For example, governmental regulation of parade routes can affect speech rights, but gen-
erally such regulation is valid. For a good discussion of current Supreme Court treatment of bur-
dens on fundamental rights, see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1176 (1996).
11. In some cases, for example, infringement of commercial speech rights, the government
need only show that its action was "substantially related" to an "important governmental interest"
12. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to use contraceptives); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to decide to terminate a pregnancy).
13. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
14. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
15. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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part of the "liberty" that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 6
Fundamental rights analysis has become crucial under equal pro-
tection doctrine as well. If the governmental action results in an un-
equal allocation of a fundamental right, then the Court will apply
heightened scrutiny in the same way it does in an equal protection
claim in which there is a suspect classification. Thus, for example,
when the right to vote is not denied, but it is restricted to property
owners, a non-suspect class, there is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 7
In asking whether the state can abolish marriage, I am not interest-
ed in the fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine. Total
abolition of marriage entails something more than a mere unequal
allocation of marriage rights. Scholars who have used fundamental
rights analysis to argue that denial of marriage to same-sex couples
violates the Fourteenth Amendment have been making equal protection
arguments, not substantive due process arguments. By contrast, I will
focus on the question: does abolition of marriage violate substantive
due process?
B. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
1. In General
The Supreme Court has described marriage as an interest "of basic
importance in society,"'" "the most important relation in life,"'19 "a
vital personal right,"'  "of fundamental importance,"' and "funda-
mental to our very existence." In at least three cases, 23 the Court
has held that marriage is an implied fundamental right for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' Most commentators agree,25 or at least
16. "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law... . " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See, e.g., Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
18. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
19. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
20. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
21. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
22. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
23. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 381; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94
(1987).
24. Some fundamental rights are explicitly stated in the text of the Constitution. These in-
clude First Amendment rights relating to freedom of speech and religion as well as the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of trial by jury. By contrast, marriage is nowhere mentioned. As a funda-
mental right, it is generally thought to be a part of the privacy right first recognized in Griswold v.
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fail to question this pronouncement.'
Because marriage is viewed as a fundamental right, its abolition
would seem contrary to the dictates of fundamental rights jurispru-
dence. For example, the fundamental right of privacy, which includes
the right to use contraceptives,' would be violated if a state banned
the use of contraceptives. Similarly, if a state banned marriage, the ban
would appear to violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due
process.
Yet marriage is different from other implied fundamental rights.'
The right to privacy and the right to interstate travel" can be de-
scribed as negative rights, rights that prohibit the state from taking
action that will interfere with individual choice. These rights place no
obvious affirmative obligations on the state. By contrast, the right of
marriage requires the state to do something, in particular to recognize
the relationship and presumably to accord it certain legal protections.'
Another strange thing about marriage as a fundamental right is
that, although the United States Constitution is said to protect the right,
the Court has acknowledged that the states have full power to deter-
mine what the content of the marriage right is.3 There is, for exam-
ple, no developed case law which provides a core definition of mar-
riage. Thus, if the right to marry requires a state to provide certain
minimum benefits, there is no clear indication as to what those benefits
might be.
One cannot even tell under current Supreme Court jurisprudence
whether marriage is a "fundamental right" for purposes of substantive
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. See, e.g.. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624,
667-68 (1980).
26. See, e.g., Jennifer Heeb, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American Family and the
Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SErON HALL L. REV. 347 (1993). But see Steven Homer,
Against Marriage, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994); Earl Maltz, Constitutional Protection
for the Right to Marry: A Dissenting View, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 949 (1992).
27. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
28. Implied fundamental rights include the right to vote, which is nowhere explicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution. I believe the right to marry is similar to the right to vote. See discussion
infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
29. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (recognizing the right to interstate travel
as a fundamental right).
30. Some talk of the right to marry as though the right were solely about state recognition of
the marriage relationship. But the state must also attach some consequences to that recognition,
otherwise the right to marry is a right with no content.
31. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) ([M]arriage is a social relation subject to
the State's police power."); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) ("[Marriage] has always
been subject to the control of the legislature.").
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due process (which would suggest it could not be abolished), or wheth-
er it is only a fundamental right whose allocation must adhere to no-
tions of equal protection. Although classification as a fundamental right
often raises both substantive due process and equal protection claims,
that is not the case with all fundamental rights. Equal protection may
require equal allocation of a right that has not otherwise been recog-
nized as an independent right protected by substantive due process.32
No right to marry case has been analyzed and decided as a "pure"
substantive due process case. Nor has any right to vote case. Thus both
the right to marry and the right to vote, although subject to equal allo-
cation constraints, can theoretically be abolished in total without violat-
ing due process.33 I suggest that the similarity between these two
rights might explain this phenomenon.'
First, let me explain what I mean by a "pure" substantive due
process case. "Pure" substantive due process cases involve the wide-
spread denial of a "fundamental right." Griswold v. Connecticut5 is
such a case. The Connecticut statute that was held unconstitutional in
Griswold denied all couples, married and unmarried, same-sex or oppo-
site-sex, the right to use contraceptives. Roe v. Wade' is also a "pure"
substantive due process case because the criminalization of abortion by
the State of Texas effectively denied access to abortion to all within the
state.
By contrast, some cases involve an unequal allocation of a "funda-
mental right," rather than a widespread denial of the right. These cases
32. See e.g., Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relation-
ship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHIi. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1988) ("rhe
'fundamental rights' branch of equal protection doctrine is self-consciously designed to prohibit
states from drawing impermissible lines with respect to rights that the Due Process Clause does
not substantively protect."). Sunstein cites Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), as an exam-
ple in which the equal protection analysis protected a fundamental right (the right to procreate)
that has not been recognized as a substantive right under the Due Process Clause.
33. See discussion regarding the right to vote infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
Other scholars have suggested that the right to vote could be totally abolished. See Sunstein, supra
note 32.
34. But see Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy
and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501 (1997) (arguing that the similarities between vot-
ing and marriage rights help explain why they are both recognized as fundamental rights). Profes-
sor Strassberg makes a compelling argument about why neither voting nor marriage may be con-
stitutionally abolished. Her position may well be correct as a matter of what ought to be. My only
point in this essay is that, contrary to the assumptions of many lawyers, existing constitutional
doctrine does not necessarily protect individuals against state abolition of their voting rights or of
their marriage rights.
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1996]
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are really equal protection rather than substantive due process cases.
Eisenstadt v. Baird,37 for example, the contraceptive case following
Griswold, was decided as an equal protection case because the statute
at issue distinguished between married and unmarried persons. Al-
though the challenged statute burdened the very same "fundamental
right" recognized by the Griswold Court,38 the statute created an un-
equal allocation of the right rather than a widespread denial. The Con-
necticut statute in Griswold had banned the use of contraceptives by
all, whereas the Massachusetts statute in Eisenstadt criminalized the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.39 Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, applied rational basis review and found that the
distinction between married and unmarried individuals was unjustified.
Narrowly read, Eisenstadt was a mere non-suspect classification equal
protection case, which flunked the rational basis test. However, given
the fact that non-suspect classifications almost always survived rational
basis review,' the outcome in Eisenstadt must be explained in part by
the fact that the right at issue (i.e., the right to use contraceptives) had
been previously recognized as a "fundamental right."'  Thus,
Eisenstadt belongs in the "fundamental rights" branch of equal protec-
tion cases.
Similar to Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court's right to marry cases
have all involved situations in which some, but not all, people experi-
enced a denial of the right. In Loving, the right was denied to those
who wished to marry a person of opposite race.42 In Zablocki, only
37. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
38. Griswold is often described as a case in which "marital privacy" is burdened. However,
in Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan characterized the privacy right as one that inhered in the individual.
Justice Brennan stated "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at
453.
39. The Massachusetts statute generally prohibited distribution, but created an exception for
registered physicians who prescribed contraceptives for their married patients.
40. But see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (classification based on sex failed to meet
rational basis test).
41. One might also view most abortion cases subsequent to Roe as equal protec-
tion/fundamental rights cases. The right to choose is a fundamental right for substantive due pro-
cess purposes. And it cannot be widely denied. Roe stands for that proposition. Mere regulation of
abortion, however, creates a burden on the right for some, but not all women. If the burden is
substantial, then the burden is "undue" in the words of the Casey joint opinion, and therefore, un-
constitutional because it cannot be justified. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 989 (1992). In other cases, where the burden is insubstantial, only rational basis
review will be required. Id.
42. Although Loving is cited as a substantive due process case in which the right to marry is
QLR
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parents who had child support obligations which they could not demon-
strate an ability to meet were denied the right to marry. And in Turner,
the burdened class was prisoners.
Thus, all of these cases fall in the equal protection category of
fundamental rights analysis.43 The cases are consistent with the princi-
ple that once the state grants a fundamental right (here, state recogni-
tion of the marriage relationship), it must do so on an equal basis,
unless it can justify the unequal allocation. Further, as the fundamental
rights prong of equal protection analysis has been developed, the un-
equal allocation will be strictly scrutinized only if there is a "direct and
substantial" burden on the right." The fact that all marriage cases in-
volve selective denial of the right, distinguishes them from "pure"
substantive due process cases such as Griswold.
Just as no marriage case fits neatly within the "pure" substantive
due process category, neither do the right to vote cases. The Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down a Virginia poll tax in Harp-
er v. Virginia State Board of Elections.45 It was the first time the
Court had explicitly used strict scrutiny in a voting rights case. The
Court's reasoning, however, was less than clear. Strict scrutiny might
have been required because of the fundamental nature of the right, or
because the Court viewed wealth as a suspect classification.' Three
years later, in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,4 the Court
stressed the fundamental nature of the right to vote. However, the
Court did not say that states must grant citizens the right to vote in
protected, the opinion is primarily an equal protection opinion. However, Justice Warren's opinion
does end with a statement that the Virginia statutes, in addition to violating equal protection, "also
deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." But his explanation for why the denial is unconstitutional sounds
in equal protection. He says: "To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as
the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's
citizens of liberty without due process of law." Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
43. Since our past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance,
and since the classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we
believe that "critical examination" of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is
required. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978).
44. Id. See also Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1996) (anti-nepotism rules do
not place a direct and substantial burden on marriage); Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid. 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom; Coe v. Axelrod, 459
U.S. 827 (1982) (minimum age restrictions do not create total deprivation of right to marry, but
only a delay).
45. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
46. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSITtrIoNAL LAW 842 (12th ed. 1991).
47. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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state elections. Rather, Kramer described the individual interests at
stake as the right to fair representation and the right to equal participa-
tion, or "equal voice," in the selection process. 4 This characterization
places the right to vote in the equal protection line of fundamental
rights cases as opposed to the substantive due process line of cases.
Subsequently, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Ro-
driguez,49 the Court responded to the plaintiffs' attempt to link educa-
tion and voting rights with the following observation:
Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right, we
assume that [plaintiffs'] references to that right are simply shorthand refer-
ences to the protected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to partici-
pate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever
the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent
any segment of the State's population."
The Court has never recognized the right to vote as an indepen-
dent substantive right protected under the Due Process Clause. It has
only considered cases in which the right is allocated unequally."' If a
state were to abolish in total the right of its citizens to vote in state
elections, no explicit provision of the United States Constitution would
be violated. Thus, there is likely no violation of substantive due pro-
cess.52 If the State of Connecticut abolished voting, its government
would certainly lose legitimacy and the guarantee of a "Republican
Form of Government" '53 would be jeopardized. However, new consti-
tutional arguments and theory would have to be developed for the Su-
preme Court to find a constitutional violation for which it could order a
remedy.54
Whether the right to vote is protected under substantive due pro-
cess, is an open question and one that is not likely to require an answer
48. Id. at 631-33.
49. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
50. Id. at 35 n. 78.
51. See Reynolds v. Sims, 379 U.S. 70 (1964); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Hill v. Stone, 420 U.S. 289 (1975). All of these cases
were decided under equal protection.
52. See generally Emily Calhoun, The First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights
Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REv. 549, 554-55 (1985) (discussing debate amongst academics over
whether voting is a true fundamental right).
53. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
54. The guarantee of a republican form of government is non-justiciable. See GUNTHER, su-
pra note 46, at 842. Gunther suggests, however, that the right to vote might be derived from struc-
tural arguments.
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so long as no state is threatening to repeal the voting rights of citi-
zens.5 The difficulties in arguing that the right to vote is a fundamen-
tal right for substantive due process purposes are: (1) the contours of
the right are supposed to be determined by the states,' and (2) recog-
nition and protection of the right requires positive action by the states.
These difficulties are the very same difficulties faced by the right
to marry. First, marriage is a creature of state law. The Supreme Court
cases that purport to recognize a fundamental right to marry do not
provide any core defimition of the right. Instead they defer to state
definitions. Only when the state refuses to let certain people into the
state-defined institution, or when the state violates the anti-discrimina-
tion principle, does the Court apply constitutional protections."
Second, marriage is different from other rights that have been
declared fundamental under the Due Process Clause. It is most obvi-
ously different from those implied rights that are derived from the right
of privacy recognized in Griswold. Privacy, autonomy, and abortion
rights all can be characterized as negative liberties. By contrast, recog-
nition of marriage requires positive action by the state. 8
55. See Michael Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1079 (1979) (observing that it is "wholly unnecessary for the Court to de-
clare that there is a constitutional right to vote in state elections, because the existence of the
franchise as a political-moral right is unquestioned," recognized by every state, and "no state
would think to deny [it]").
56. Subject of course to the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause.
57. Loving might be viewed as a case in which the Supreme Court rejected the state defini-
tion of marriage as a union between persons of the same race. But a better explanation is thai the
"same-race" definition violated the anti-discrimination principle by supporting white supremacy.
Similarly some gender discrimination cases have affected state definitions of marriage in the same
way. These cases have not provided a substantive core definition, but have placed a limiting rule
on marriage law declaring that its rules must reflect gender equality rather than male superiority.
See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1973) (holding that if a state authorizes alimony awards for
wives, it must also authorize them for husbands); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981)
(holding Louisiana's "head and master" law unconstitutional, because it gave husbands the uni-
lateral power to dispose of jointly-owned marital property).
58. As one commentator has explained:
Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforce-
able according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent
'legalness' of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be secured simply by
removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law
itself must create the 'thing' to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry
necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal frame-
work.
William H. Hohengarten, Same Sex Marriage and The Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L. J. 1495,
1496 (1994).
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2. Only Negative Liberty is Protected by the Due Process Clause
Judge Richard Posner has described the Constitution as a "charter
of negative liberties." He stated that "[t]he Constitution is a charter of
negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not re-
quire the federal government or the state to provide services, even so
elementary a service as maintaining law and order."'59 Other circuit
courts of appeal have agreed.' And the United States Supreme Court
endorsed this description in DeShaney v. Winnebago County.6'
These cases all involve instances in which a state official failed to
act,' as opposed to the state legislature failing to act. However, the
idea that the Due Process Clause does not require positive state action
has also been applied in cases involving legislation. The abortion fund-
ing cases provide one example. In ruling on the constitutionality of the
Hyde Amendment, a legislative restriction on abortion funding which
was passed by Congress, the Court explained: "although government
may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her free-
dom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation."'
Thus, even though abortion may be a fundamental right, the state is not
required to provide abortions to those who need them by affirmatively
paying for them."
Political theorists such as Isaiah Berlin' and John Stuart Mill"
have argued that the only sort of liberty a state should provide its citi-
zens is negative liberty. For the state to become involved in the pro-
vision of positive or substantive goods might result in excessive state
involvement in determining what does or does not constitute the good
life. 7 Liberal political theory requires that the state remain neutral on
59. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
60. See, e.g., Wright v. Ozark, 715 F.2d 1513, 1515 (11th Cir. 1983).
61. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See also Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1989)
(citing DeShaney for the idea that the Constitution is a "charter of negative liberties").
62. See, e.g., Jackson v. Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1983) (policeman failed to
rescue persons from a burning car at an accident scene); Wright, 686 F.2d at 1513 (police and
others failed to protect against rape); Benavides, 883 F.2d at 386 (jail officials failed to protect
inmates during an escape attempt); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 (Wisconsin social workers failed to
protect Joshua DeShaney from the near-fatal beatings of his father).
63. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, at 315 (1980); See also Maher & Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
64. Harris, 448 U.S. at 315; Maher, 432 U.S. at 464.
65. See ISAIAH BERLN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, IN FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118
(1969).
66. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16-17 (Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1956).
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this question. Thus, the state is not required to provide any social,
material, or political good other than individual freedom, which, so the
argument goes, is fully protected by the state's guarantee of negative
rights.
The language of the Due Process Clause also supports the notion
that only negative rights are protected. The prohibition on state action
is phrased negatively: "nor shall any State deprive." This language does
not mandate the state to provide. Other constitutional provisions, in-
cluding amendments in the Bill of Rights, are stated positively. For
example, states must provide a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.
Positively stated commands impose positive obligations. Negatively
stated commands do not.'
American constitutional lawyers regularly and sharply differentiate liberty
from empowerment. We know the conceptual difference between being at
liberty to speak and having the ability and resources with which to speak
effectively. The prevailing view is that our Constitution by and large guaran-
tees only the liberties, not the abilities or resources."
Not all constitutional scholars agree with this "negative liberty"
thesis.7' Scholars who embrace the ideals of civic republicanism, for
example, argue that the state should provide moral education for its
citizens as a necessary pre-requisite for enlightened self-government.7'
Under this view, the state should enable communication and debate
between individuals (a "positive liberty" value) rather than merely
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our
own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their
efforts to obtain it .... Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as
seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
Id.
68. See David Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CI. L. REv. 864,
873 (1986).
69. Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U. Cti. L.
REV. 91, 96 (1992).
70. See, e.g., Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CAL. L. REv.
407 (1966); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term--Foreword: Constitutional Adjudi-
cation and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966); Frank Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Nega-
tive Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Susan Bandes, The Negative
Constitution: A Critique, 88 MicH. L. REV. 2271 (1990).
71. For an excellent discussion of the liberalism vs. civic republicanism debate in the context
of the state's role in education, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me
Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV.
581, 646-60 (1993).
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leaving individuals alone.
Other commentators argue that emphasizing the protection of
negative liberty is inappropriate in today's world. As one commentator,
Seth Kreimer, has explained, "[T]he conception of negative rights as
freedom from coercive violence has questionable value in shaping
constitutional restraints on a government that more often exerts its
power by withholding benefits than by threatening bodily harm."
Courts have chipped away at the "negative liberty" thesis, recog-
nizing exceptions to the general rule that the Constitution requires no
affirmative obligations. For example, once the state has acted, it may
be required to act responsibly. 3 Also, when the state has custody of a
person, the state may owe that person certain minimal protections."4
Nonetheless, after the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney, it is
unlikely that the Court will recognize any affirmative obligations under
substantive due process, absent special circumstances such as a special
relationship between the individual and the state. Thus, those implied
fundamental rights that are viewed as part of the "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause are, under current decisional law, restricted to
negative liberties.
3. Conclusion: Marriage Can be Abolished So Long as Intimacy is
Protected
Both positive and negative liberty are implicated in state recogni-
tion of marriage. The positive liberty aspects are of two kinds: (1)
providing economic and social benefits to couples who are married,
and (2) taking positive action to enable the togetherness of married
couples.76 There is no precedent for concluding that the state must
72. Kreimer, supra note 70, at 1295.
73. See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that police are under
an affirmative obligation to protect children after arresting the adult who was with them).
74. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding a duty to provide medical care to
incarcerated prisoners); See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding a duty owed
to person who is institutionalized and wholly dependent on the state).
75. For example, federal tax law allows spouses to make gifts to each other free of transfer
taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 2056 and 2523 (West 1996). Only spouses benefit from community property
regimes and only spouses can own property as tenants by the entirety, an estate which protects
one spouse from the creditors of the other spouse. Spouses cannot disinherit each other. See, e.g.,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.236 (West 1992) (elective share provision for surviving spouse).
76. For example, immigration laws permit foreign spouses of American citizens to enter the
United States as long-term residents. See 2 CHARLES GORDON ET. AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 36.02 (1996). The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 requires certain employ-
ers to grant employees leave for the purpose of caring for a spouse who is seriously ill. See 29
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either provide benefits or enable togetherness. Thus, the only issue is
whether marriage must be recognized in order to protect negative liber-
ty.
The negative liberty aspects of marriage include those privacy
rights that the Court has explicitly recognized, not just in marriage
relationships, but in family relationships generally. This "right to inti-
mate association" was described in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees:
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to
secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of
certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of
sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State .... Without precisely
identifying every consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional
protection, we have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as
critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State .... More-
over, the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realiza-
tion that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty."
The marital relationship has been afforded protection from unwar-
ranted state interference," so have other family relationships, includ-
ing parent/child 9 and grandmother/grandchild.' Although the Su-
preme Court has not had occasion to determine which adult sexual
relationships will be protected and which will not,8' it has never indi-
U.S.C. §§ 2611-2654 (1994).
77. 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
78. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
79. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
80. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
81. One might view Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as a case in which the Court
held the relationship was not worthy of protection. At one level, Hardwick might be distinguished
from other "intimate association" cases by looking at the difference in the relationships. Hardwick,
after all, did not involve a long-term committed relationship, but rather a casual one. The right at
issue in that case is best described as an individual privacy-right, which the Court declared unpro-
tected by the Constitution. Hardwick did not involve a jointly-shared right of intimacy akin to that
experienced in the ideal marriage.
I do not assert this as a matter of fact, but rather as a statement about the Court's view of
the facts. Michael Hardwick and his partner may well have shared a deep and intimate relationship
beyond the sex act that was at the focus of the case. But, if they did, the Court did not see it or
understand it as such. Justice White, speaking for the majority, said: "No connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent." Id. at 191.
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cated that the right of intimate association should be limited to married
couples.82 Furthermore, lower courts have recognized the right of inti-
mate association in cases involving unmarried adult couples."
If intimacy is the value worthy of protection, then the negative
liberty thesis ought to prohibit the state from unduly interfering in
intimacy that is valuable. Marriage appears to have served as a bright
line to identify those couples whose intimacy is presumed to be deserv-
ing of such protection. Whether it is a constitutionally mandated bright
line is open to question. Relying on the Court's description of intimate
association in Roberts, one can conclude that any couple who can
demonstrate a level of commitment to a shared life from which they
"draw... emotional enrichment" ought to be protected from state
intrusion. Thus, intimacy outside of the marriage context ought to be
accorded constitutional protection, in which case marriage as a bright
line would be under-inclusive.
Furthermore, the presumption that all married couples experience
"good" intimacy which is deserving of constitutional protection has
proved to be untrue. A major contribution of the modem women's
movement has been to expose the abusiveness in intimate relationships,
including marriage.8' The widespread evidence of spousal battering
and marital rape show that marriage is often not the best proxy for
"good" intimacy. s5 Using marriage as a bright line would be over-in-
clusive.
Thus, I conclude that protection of "good" intimacy, of family
integrity, of close personal relationships is at the core of the negative
liberties that have been recognized by the Court in its marriage and
family privacy cases. The state need not recognize marriage to protect
these values. Rather, intimacy can be protected in those cases in which
At another level, the Court's failure to understand the intimate nature of the relationship in
Hardwick or the connection between "homosexual activity" and "family" might explain why the
case was wrongly decided.
82. In Roberts, the Court said.
Determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a
particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that
relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to
the most attenuated of personal attachments .... We need not mark the potentially
significant points on this terrain with any precision.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
83. Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984) (recognizing constitutionally protected
freedom of association in dating relationship).
84. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 237-44 (1989).
85. See DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982).
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the parties demonstrate personal commitment to a shared life. This
means that substantive due process is not violated if marriage is abol-
ished.
H. IMAGINE A WORLD WrrHOUT MARRIAGE
A. Introduction
In a world without marriage, meaning no legal recognition of
marriage, committed adult dyads would continue to exist. Two people
in love would continue to pledge their troths to each other and to make
promises akin to the familiar "until death do us part." A repeal of the
legal institution of marriage would do nothing more radical than this: it
would force opposite sex couples into the very world that same-sex
couples now inhabit.
Those of us who are gay and lesbian can imagine such a world
because it is our world. Those who are not gay and lesbian and who
believe in marriage, whether as a legal institution, a moral one, or just
one that adequately expresses one's current commitment to another,
have a bit more difficulty with the image."M
What would a world without marriage look like? First, all couples
who wished to formalize their understandings of personal and financial
commitment and responsibility would have to do so for themselves,
that is, without the state's provision of a default set of rules known as
the marriage contract." Same-sex couples currently do this, as do
some opposite-sex couples who opt out of marriage. Privately drafted
contracts in lieu of, or in addition to the state-drafted marriage contract,
are a good thing. Not all relationships are the same. Customized
agreements that reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties make
it easier for the couple to live up to those expectations.'M Furthermore,
86. In addition to the lesbiangay community in which there is no choice regarding marriage,
there are many feminists who have chosen to reject the world of marriage. Although they are
more able to imagine a world without marriage than those who have chosen marriage, their expe-
rience, and thus their perspective, is very much different from those of us who are not only forced
into the world of no marriage, but are also perceived by others with whom we come in contact as
uncoupled, uncommitted, and thus single. Committed opposite-sex couples will be presumed to be
married, and silence on their part generally supports that presumption. By contrast, everyone
knows that same-sex couples, no matter how committed they are to each other, are, in the eyes of
the law, unmarried.
87. The marriage contract provides only a few rules about the ongoing marriage relationship.
Examples include the spousal support obligation, presumption that the husband is father of all
children born during the marriage, and criminal laws about sex outside of marriage. Ther are
many more rules regulating the dissolution of the marriage, i.e., divorce.
88. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State
1996]
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couples who discuss their expectations in advance of commitment are
much less likely to be disappointed at some future date when it turns
out that the two people had very different images of how they might
live their lives together. American culture, the culture of romantic love
and marriage, may well contribute to the destabilization of long term
coupledom, as expressed in the current regime of state-defined mar-
riage. The romantic notion that love conquers all, that love is blind,
and that marriage is the ultimate expression of that love, may lead
couples all too quickly into a relationship that is not of their own mak-
ing.8 9
B. Rights and Responsibilities of the Couple
Without marriage, couples would have to negotiate their own
contracts. These private contracts could easily cover questions of prop-
erty rights and support rights. They could also cover questions regard-
ing the raising of children.
1. Property Rights
Lesbian and gay couples negotiate their own contracts in lieu of
marriage. Under current law these contracts are fully enforceable unless
they violate the public policy doctrine of contract law. Post Marvin,"'
most courts have upheld contracts between same-sex couples, at least
to the extent they allocate property rights. If the contract appears to
require payment for sexual services, the contract may not be enforced,
however, since sex for money is against public policy. 9'
Thus, lesbian and gay couples often negotiate contracts in which
they make agreements about who will make payments for upkeep on
Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 251 (1982) ("If individual happiness is the primary goal of intimacy,
then individual preferences as to intimate arrangements should be honored.").
89. There is empirical evidence that individuals are unrealistically optimistic about the likeli-
hood that their own marriages will succeed. See Lynn A. Baker and Robert E. Emery, When Every
Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage,
17 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 439, 443 (1993). They are also badly informed about the state-imposed
terms to their marriage contracts. Id. at 441 (asserting that knowledge of state-imposed terms
"only slightly better than chance"). See also MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY:
THE RHErRIC AND REALITY OF DivoRcE REFoRM (1991).
90. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (1976) (holding that public policy considerations do not
void a contract between unmarried cohabitants except to the extent the contract is "explicitly
founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services").
91. See Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981). See also Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645
(Ga. 1992) (dissenting opinion would not enforce written contract between two lesbians regarding
home ownership because their relationship involved illegal sexual activity, presumably sodomy).
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property (e.g., mortgage payments, repairs, and property taxes) and
how proceeds will be split if the property is sold. The most important
asset for same-sex and opposite sex couples usually is the home. Even
when unmarried couples resist contracting for support and love and
commitment,' they will often be advised to contract for terms regard-
ing the division of the home in the event the relationship ends. In some
ways, these contracts mirror the buy-sell agreements of unrelated par-
ties who own property or businesses together. But they often include
terms that are rarely present in contracts between unrelated parties. For
example, a lesbian couple may provide that fault in ending a relation-
ship should be considered in determining who gets to keep the home.
Or, the couple may understand that the relationship is sufficiently frag-
ile that it may not last forever and bargain for terms that will not bur-
den either party in the event the relationship is ended. Such terms may
include generous buy-out provisions for the partner who is more per-
sonally attached to the home, or in some cases, provisions for joint use
of the home even after the relationship has ended.
In a world without marriage, relationship contracts that provide the
terms for property division in the event the relationship ends would
take the place of divorce laws. Such contracts should be an adequate
substitute for divorce laws provided the couple has bothered to enter
into an express contract."o Absent express contracts, the law of im-
plied contracts and property would determine how property should be
divided when two persons both have claims to ownership."
In a world without marriage, all couples would be treated the
same by the law. The state would take neither side in a dispute over
92. Law is the enemy of unmarried couples with respect to these terms. Contract law has
developed around commercial exchanges and not around personal relationships. Marriage and
family law has been the legal domain of personal relationships. Thus, unmarried couples who wish
to express their understandings about love, commitment, and emotional support are often advised
to leave those terms out of legal contracts. The message that is sent to the lesbian and gay com-
munity when such advice (and it is responsible advice) is given is that the only thing that matters
about a relationship, the only thing the law will protect, is economic interests. One has to wonder
about a legal system that says economic interests are more important than the human heart. But
see Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy,
70 CAL. L. REv. 204 at 294 (1982) ("Another change that is particularly important with respect to
the feasibility of contractual governance of intimate relationships is the increased recognition of
the non-economic dimensions of contract.").
93. Contract law would provide protections against overreaching, as it does today under
doctrines of unconscionability, duress, etc.
94. There is a substantial body of case law that has developed recognizing and enforcing
implied and oral contracts between unmarried cohabitants. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923
(Ariz. 1986); Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 521 A.2d 142 (1987).
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property and proof of an intimate relationship would give rise to no
particularized set of default rules regarding ownership of property. The
existence of the relationship would merely be one factor in proving to a
court what the intent of the parties was regarding property ownership.
2. Support Rights
The state-imposed marriage contract imposes support obligations
for husbands and wives.95 This obligation, as enforced by the courts,
is quite minimal. It covers only "necessaries" and does not obligate
one spouse for the debts of the other spouse generally.' Lesbian and
gay couples who draft their own contracts, by contrast, often provide
that income will be pooled for their mutual support or that one partner
will support the other by making all household payments. There are no
reported cases dealing with enforcement of support rights between
95. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.001(2) (West 1993) (spouses "owe to each other mu-
tual responsibility and support," and "[elach spouse has an equal obligation in accordance with his
or her ability to contribute money or services or both which are necessary for the adequate support
and maintenance of... the other spouse.").
"Providing for a spouse's necessary medical treatment according to one's ability is a duty
of support owed under section 765.001(2) ...... St Mary's Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Brody, 519
N.W.2d 706, 710 (Wis. CL App. 1994).
96. The meaning of "necessaries" is inexact and may vary from state to state. "Necessaries"
include medical expenses and other items similarly required for the spouse's well-being. Thus,
when a wife must defend herself against criminal charges, the husband may be required to pay for
an attorney. See Elder v. Rosenwasser, 144 N.E. 669 (N.Y. 1924):
Where a wife living with her husband, whom he is obliged to support, is arrested on a
criminal charge or prosecuted in a civil action which may result in her incarceration,
the necessity for a lawyer may be as urgent and as important as the necessity for a
doctor when she is sick.... The mental suffering and anguish which may result from
an unwarranted suit for alleged libel may be as disastrous in its effects as any other
mental sickness or disorder. Such actions may, therefore, dependent, of course, upon
circumstances, require the husband to pay a reasonable lawyer's bill for services in
protecting his wife.
Id. at 670.
See also D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. Huth, 49 So.2d 875 (La. App. 1951) (holding dresses,
umbrella, cologne, hosiery, scarf, men's shirts worn with slacks at home, costume jewelry, slippers
and underthings costing $131.41 were necessities). The obligation to provide necessaries may
cease if the spouse leaves the marital home. "The husband's duty is to provide for the support of
his wife at the matrimonial domicile, but he is nevertheless under the obligation to furnish support
to her if she is forced to find shelter elsewhere, when the separation was not caused through her
fault." Id. at 877.
97. The spouse is only liable for necessaries and not other items purchased on credit. See,
e.g., Bergh v. Warner, 50 N.W. 77 (Minn. 1891) (holding diamond earrings not "necessaries");
Stevens v. Hush, 176 N.Y.S. 602, 605 (N.Y. App. 1919) (vacation expenses not "necessaries").
See also Mathews Furniture Co. v. La Bella, 44 So.2d 160 (La. App.) (holding furniture company
could not recover against husband for furniture sold to wife on wife's credit).
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same-sex couples during the relationship," but presumably the terms
would be enforced provided they did not violate public policy.
Support rights and obligations generally become important at the
time of divorce. Obligations of support exist during the relationship
because the relationship is mutually beneficial. But once the relation-
ship ends, different considerations enter the question of whether one
spouse should continue to be responsible for the other.99 In a world
without marriage, spouses at time of divorce could not rely on state
laws regarding alimony or even on equitable distribution laws that take
one spouse's dependency on the other into account when dividing
property. In a world without marriage, couples would have to bargain
on their own for such support rights to continue in the event the rela-
tionship ended.
Forward-looking couples might well include such terms in their
relationship agreements provided they were well informed and both
partners had equal power in negotiating the terms. Couples often ar-
range their personal lives in a way that increases the dependency of
one partner on the other. Such arrangements are common not just for
married couples, but also for committed same-sex couples. These ar-
rangements occur because couples operate as a unit for the benefit of
the unit. As time passes, however, decisions made for the benefit of the
unit may turn out to benefit one partner more than the other once the
unit is dissolved. For example, couples may agree that one partner
should stay home and take care of the house and children, while the
other develops a career. Similarly, a couple may agree to move to a
new location in order to improve the employment opportunities of one
of the partners. If the relationship continues, what is good for the unit
is also good for the individual partners. But if the relationship ends at a
time when one partner has been consistently disadvantaged regarding
individual market skills, then the advantaged partner should be obligat-
ed to make an equitable adjustment. In the absence of explicit contract
terms so providing, a court might rely on implied contract terms or on
98. Cases regarding support tend to arise when the relationship ends, either by "divorce" or
by death. See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillinham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988) (regarding claim
brought at "divorce" based on verbal agreement to support for life). See also Cox v. Elwing, 432
A.2d 736 (D.C. App. 1981)(claim for support to survive summary judgment, but unclear whether
relationship had terminated).
99. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQuALrrY: THE RHEToIuc AND REALITY
OF DIVORCE REFORM 41-42 (1991) (pointing out that judges consider some factors based on the
needs of the relative spouses when dividing property at divorce and criticizing the fact that not
enough weight is given to factors of need and dependency).
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equitable principles regarding unjust enrichment. We do not need mar-
riage and divorce laws to accomplish this result because private con-
tract law is sufficient.
3. Children
Marriage as a legal institution has historically held great signifi-
cance for children. The law makes a distinction between children born
in and out of marriage, designating those born outside of marriage as
illegitimate, and, until recently, severely limiting their rights. °° Al-
though marriage continues to impact children,' modern legal trends
have lessened that impact. Because unmarried mothers and fathers both
owe a duty of support to their children, marriage is generally irrelevant
to the issue of child support. And in many states, marriage is no longer
the only route to becoming an adoptive parent. In some states, single
persons can adopt. In addition, several states have allowed the same-
sex partner of a biological parent to adopt the child, even though the
partners are unable to marry under state law."°
In a world without marriage, the state would continue to have an
interest in protecting children. A parent's responsibility for a child
exists independent of marriage and would continue to do so. In a world
without marriage, however, couples would be more likely to negotiate
private contracts regarding child-raising and child support responsibili-
ties. Such contracts might also include terms regarding obligations for
support and rights of visitation when the relationship ends. Lesbian
couples, for example, often enter into such contracts when they decide
to raise a child together. 3 The question might arise whether contracts
involving children violate public policy concerns regarding the state
interests in child welfare. As a general matter, I should think such
100. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (striking down state law that barred
non-marital children from bringing a wrongful death action for the loss of a mother); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (striking down Texas law that made fathers liable for support only to
their legitimate children); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down state law that
prevented illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers).
101. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding a California statute
that presumed the husband of the mother to be the father of a child despite the biological father's
claim of paternity and his desire to visit his daughter).
102. See, e.g., In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397
(N.Y. 1995); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
103. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the second
parent had no standing to assert visitation rights because she was not a parent under New York's
Domestic Relations Law and ignoring the contract in which the biological mother and partner had
agreed at time of dissolution of relationship to visitation and continued support).
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contracts would be fully enforceable so long as the partners can show
that the contract was negotiated with the best interests of the child in
mind. Indeed, with respect to agreements about custody and visitation
in the event the relationship is dissolved, terms negotiated by the part-
ners at the beginning of the relationship are likely to be a better solu-
tion than terms determined by a family law judge based upon evidence
submitted at the termination of the relationship. I do not mean to sug-
gest that privately negotiated contracts ought to trump the "best inter-
ests" of the child. Contracts which are clearly not in the "best interests"
of the child should not be enforced. However, many fights over custo-
dy and visitation present very close questions in which the prior
agreement of the parties ought to be determinative.
In the absence of any prior agreement, a couple who is unable to
reach a current agreement regarding support, visitation, and custody
will have to ask the state to intervene. If marriage were abolished, then
there would be no divorce to trigger state intervention. Instead, state
intervention would be triggered whenever unresolvable disagreements
arose. State recognition of marriage is not necessary to determine who
is the best custodian of a child.
C. The Couple and the State
A world without marriage would be one in which privately negoti-
ated contracts regarding personal relationships would be the norm.
Such a world ought to be imaginable as to the couple's property rights,
support rights, and their relationship with children whom they agree to
co-parent. When the issues involve questions of rights and responsibili-
ties between the members of the "marital unit," private law can be used
to resolve disputes. However, if the state becomes a necessary party,
private law is insufficient.
Tax law and immigration law are two obvious areas where the
state is a necessary party. Federal tax law recognizes the marital unit in
determining how income should be reported for income tax purposes
and in determining whether property transfers from one person to an-
other should be subject to gift and estate taxes. Immigration law grants
spouses of American citizens preferential status. In a world without
marriage, these types of benefits would have to be either denied or
made available on some other basis. Furthermore, government would
have to review benefits attached to marriage and determine whether
such benefits are worthy of continuance, and, if they are, to whom they
should be granted.
A similar issue arises when one partner dies or becomes disabled.
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In the absence of specific and enforceable private agreements between
the partners, the state becomes a necessary party in actions regarding
property disposition, medical care, and burial. Either the state must take
action on behalf of the deceased or incompetent, or the state must
appoint a representative to make decisions. In a world with marriage,
decision-making in such areas is usually assigned to the spouse or to
another legally recognized family member. These decisions are ones
that should be made by someone who knows or knew the individual
well and not by the state. In a world without marriage, the state would
have to designate the default decision maker by some other means.
Marriage, as a bright line for making these sorts of decisions, can be
justified on efficiency grounds.
The remainder of this paper addresses the question of governmen-
tal benefits and default decision makers. It will show that there are
ethical as well as efficiency justifications for state recognition of mar-
riage. Furthermore, these justifications support the notion that marriage
should be extended to same-sex couples whose relationships mirror
their opposite-sex counterparts.
IV. STATE RECOGNITION OF COUPLEs IN A
WORLD WrHouT MARRIAGE
A. Introduction
There are many benefits that are conditioned upon state recogni-
tion of the marriage relationship. Other scholars have identified these
benefits," but few have given sufficient attention to the nature of
these benefits and analyzed closely whether or not these benefits are
deserved by married couples or whether they might also be deserved by
some non-married couples."° In a recently published article, David
Chambers, takes on this task."t He divides the special rules that are
104. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 66-67
(1996); James Trosino, American Wedding; Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy,
73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 95 (1993); see also 1995 HAW. COMM'N ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW REP. 1-23 (1995) (identifying the benefits attached to marriage).
105. Instead, scholars tend to focus on the similarity between same-sex couples and married
couples and argue that there is no justification for not extending benefits to same-sex couples. See,
e.g., WuLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996); Jennifer Heeb, Ho-
mosexual Marriage, The Changing American Family, and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 347 (1993).
106. David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs
of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996).
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attached to marriage into three categories: (1) those that recognize
affective or emotional bonds, (2) those that relate to the raising of
children, and (3) those that reflect notions of the way married couples
ought to arrange their economic affairs."° He concludes that existing
rules and benefits of marriage are appropriate for and would serve the
interests of same-sex couples.
My focus in this section is somewhat different from that of Profes-
sor Chambers. I ask how recognition of marriage and its accompanying
benefits serve the interests of the state. Of course the state may be indi-
rectly benefited by serving the interests of its citizens. My purpose in
this section, however, is to describe, from the state's perspective, why
legal recognition of couples is a good thing, not just for the couple, but
for the state as a whole. I choose to focus on two sorts of benefits that
are associated with marriage, non-economic and economic. The non-
economic benefits are of two types: (1) negative liberty (non-intrusion
into a couple's intimacy), and (2) positive liberty (enabling together-
ness). Although there are numerous economic benefits attached to
marriage, I will focus primarily on tax benefits.
B. Justifications for Extending Non-Economic Benefits to Couples
Couples who share households produce real goods and services for
the members of their households and form an economy that is separate
from the production of gross national product in the market place."
Couples operate as bartering units. "I'll cook you dinner if you'll wash
the dishes." The members of the unit are the best determiners of who
should engage in which tasks, assuming equal bargaining power and
equal information. As productive units in society, couples produce
efficiency gains that carry over into the market place. Not only is it
generally less expensive in dollars for two people to live together, it
also takes less time to do necessary tasks, thereby freeing family
household members to make additional contributions beyond the house-
hold.
Couples who operate as a family do more than create economic
gains for society. Families provide emotional support for their members
and give individuals a safe place to develop psychologically. To inter-
act normally in society, individuals need to form intimate relationships
with persons they can trust more than a co-worker or a friend. The
trust and commitment in these intimate relationships generate an inter-
107. Id. at 453.
108. See Scow BURNS, THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY (1977).
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dependence that individuals come to count on in their daily lives, both
as a benefit and as a responsibility. When these relationships are work-
ing correctly, they produce a psychic benefit not just for the individuals
in them, but also for society in general."°
William Hohengarten, in arguing that marriage is not only wise
policy, but also constitutionally required, says:
Without marriage or a similar legal institution, every person is reduced to the
status of a legal atom. Individuals lose the legal medium whereby they may
join together and appear before the state and others as a couple. More im-
portantly, without marriage couples are prevented from making a legally en-
forceable commitment to remain together in an intimate relationship. In a
world in which the state has monopolized the power to enforce commitments,
the withdrawal of that power from a particular sphere of life is a productive
redeployment of state power in its own right. By eliminating the legal
framework of marriage, the state produces an isolated legal subject whose
capacity to embark upon committed projects with others is limited to the
sphere of self-interested economic transactions.... Io
Although I disagree with his conclusion that marriage is constitu-
tionally required,"' the argument that the state should enable
coupledom rather than producing "isolated legal subject[s]" is a good
policy argument in favor of marriage, or some similar legal institution.
109. Same-sex couples produce household goods and services and provide emotional stability
at the same rate as opposite-sex married couples. The book American Couples is often cited for
the proposition that same-sex couples are less stable than married couples. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN
& PEPPER ScHwARTz, AMERICAN COUPLEs at 308 (1983) (chart showing percentage of married,
unmarried heterosexual, gay men, and lesbian couples in researchers' sample who broke up). But
the statistics only show that same-sex couples are more likely than married couples to break up
when they are together less than 10 years. After ten years, the rate of break up is virtually the
same. Given the fact that the economic and social benefits of the marriage help keep couples
together in the early years and the fact that this study was done in the 1970s the differences are
not surprising. Expert testimony in Baehr v. Miike, including testimony by Dr. Pepper Schwartz,
convinced the trial judge that there was little difference between married couples and committed
same-sex couples. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *11 (Haw. Dec. 3,
1996).
110. William M. Hohengarten, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE U.
1495, 1529 (1994).
111. I disagree because although marriage is helpful in accomplishing the goals that
Hohengarten identifies, I do not believe that state recognition is necessary. Culture and society
exist apart from the state. So does the Church. Two people can celebrate their union as a cultural
event or a religious event and the relevant communities will recognize their coupledom. This fact
prevents individuals from being "reduced to the status of [an] atom," although the state may treat
them as "legal" atoms. Self-definition, creation of personhood, including personhood developed
within intimate relationships, is possible without the protection of the state. Indeed, that is what
lesbians and gay men have been doing for centuries.
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Simply stated, if certain couples produce benefits, both economic and
social, to the state, then the state ought to protect their coupledom. At
the very least, the state should protect the couple's intimacy and facili-
tate the partners' togetherness.
The question is whether courts should make the determination of
which couples to protect on a case by case basis, or should use mar-
riage (or something else) as a bright line test for differentiating deserv-
ing couples from undeserving ones. There are efficiency costs to mak-
ing determinations on a case by case basis, but those costs must be
weighed against the potential benefit to the state of protecting the right
couples. What types of factors should be considered in determining
who the "right couples" are? The following factors seem appropriate:
(1) evidence of mutual support; (2) evidence of legally enforceable
commitments; (3) the fact that the couple shares intimate space (e.g., a
home or shelter, some place that provides privacy); and (4) a statement
by the couple that they hold each other's welfare foremost and wish to
be accorded protection for their intimacy. And when should this evi-
dence be presented? Only once, or each time a question arises? If it
were to be the latter, efficiency costs would increase. In addition, it
would be hard to protect the intimacy of a couple if we could not
determine whether they were a couple until a problem had arisen. Thus,
a pre-existing bright line test would be helpful and would produce
efficiency gains.
A bright line test such as marriage would also protect privacy. If
courts are asked to make determinations on a case by case basis, they
will have to review evidence that supports the couple's claim that they
are committed to a shared life. Although this has been done in cases
involving same-sex couples," 2 offering such evidence in a public pro-
ceeding produces obvious privacy costs to the couple.
For these reasons, it is good policy for the state to recognize adult
couples. Whether that recognition is accomplished via the current insti-
tution of marriage, or some alternative institution such as domestic
partnership,"' is a question beyond the scope of this paper. It may be
112. See Braschi v. Stahl Ass'n., 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
113. Domestic partnership is a term that was coined in San Francisco in the early 1980s.
Several municipalities and employers have taken action to recognize certain couples as domestic
partners and have accorded such couples varying benefits, such as health care and bereavement
leave. There is no single definition of "domestic partner" and there are wide variances in the bene-
fits that are available to such couples. No state currently recognizes domestic partners as a legal
entity to which benefits or responsibilities attach, although the Hawaii legislature is considering
legislation that would do so for limited purposes. See H.B. 118, 19th Leg., (Haw. 1997). I would
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that efficiency gains would be increased if the state offered several
different forms of recognition to accommodate the different sorts of
couples that are deserving of protection." 4 But when it comes to pro-
tecting intimacy and enabling togetherness, all committed couples
should be equally benefited.
C. Justifications for Extending Economic Benefits to Couples
A broad range of economic benefits is extended to married cou-
ples. Tax benefits, social security benefits, health care benefits are but a
few examples. In a world without marriage, should these benefits con-
tinue, and to whom should they be extended? This question is much
more complex than the earlier question dealing with intimacy and to-
getherness. The mere fact of coupledom presumes intimacy and togeth-
erness worthy of protection. But economic benefits are quite another
thing and their appropriateness depends not just on the fact of being a
couple, but on how the partners live their economic lives." 5 Federal
tax law, for example, assumes that all spouses are similarly situated
and taxes them accordingly. In some instances the tax treatment may
be beneficial and in others it may be detrimental. For wealthy couples
at least, the benefits outweigh the detriments."' In this section, I will
focus on the law of taxation and ask whether it is beneficial to the state
to recognize marriage.
Under current tax law, state recognition of marriage is crucial. For
example, marriage determines which rate schedule a taxpayer must use
have no objection to preserving marriage for opposite sex couples and enacting domestic partner
legislation at the state level for same-sex couples so long as the rights and benefits that attached to
domestic partnership were equal to those that are attached to marriage. I do believe that domestic
partners ought to bear responsibilities to each other that are similar to the ones borne by married
couples. In addition, as with marriage, the legal relationship of domestic partners would need to be
recognized in states other than the state in which the relationship was initially established.
114. For example, the state might create one set of rules for couples who raise children and
another set of rules for couples who do not.
115. Economic benefits are often awarded to married couples on the basis of assumptions
about their economic relationships. For example, the University of Iowa gives all married employ-
ees a higher dollar amount of flexible benefit credits than it gives to single employees. This rule
doubly benefits married couples in which both partners are employed by the University. The as-
sumption at work is that a married person has greater economic responsibilities than a single em-
ployee.
116. Wealthy couples can make inter-spousal wealth transfers free of transfer tax. The tax
savings created by the marital deduction can be as high as 55% for transfers in excess of
$3,000,000. See infra Part C and I.R.C. § 2001(c) (West 1996).
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when computing federal income taxes."' Married couples have only
two choices: (1) file jointly, which for two-earner families will result in
a higher tax bill than if the two people filed as unmarried taxpay-
ers; " or (2) file as married filing separate returns, which usually
does not reduce the tax bill but does avoid the potential dangers of
joint and several liability." 9
Federal tax law, apart from the marriage penalty aspects of the
joint return," is designed to benefit spouses in several ways. First of
all, spouses may enter and exit marriage tax-free, arranging and rear-
ranging their joint and separate property interests to suit their living
arrangements. Section 1041 assures that there will be no taxable gain
on property transfers during marriage or incident to divorce, and the
100% marital deduction relieves all interspousal transfers from gift
tax." So, when two people, H and W, get married and move into the
same home, there are no tax consequences. If H owns the home and
lets W live there rent-free, there are no income or gift tax consequences
to the arrangement."2 If H sells a half interest in the home to W so
that W can share in ownership of her own home, H recognizes no tax-
able gain." If H gives W a half interest in the home, there is no tax-
able gift.'24 All economic transfers that H and W enter into in order
to create the household unit that suits their specific needs can be ac-
complished tax-free.
By contrast, unmarried couples do not receive these. benefits,"2
117. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 1996).
118. The resulting higher tax on the two-earner married couple is often called the "marriage
tax penalty." Scholars have argued that we ought to change our filing system to avoid this prob-
lem. See, e.g., Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax
Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1980); Douglas K. Chapman, Marriage Neutrality: An Old Idea
Comes of Age, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 335 (1985); Laura A. Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for
the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL L. REv. 197 (1988).
119. See Richard C. E. Beck, Joint Return Liability and Poe v. Seaborn Should Both Be Re-
pealed, 49 TAX NOTES 457 (1990).
120. Under the current rate structure, a married couple in which both spouses earn income
will pay higher taxes than two single persons with the same amount of income. See generally
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the
Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 991 (1993).
121. I.R.C. § 2523 (West 1996). See also I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1996) which provides a similar
marital deduction for bequests made to a surviving spouse.
122. When one spouse provides the other with housing, "support" is being provided. Payment
of support has never created income or gift tax issues so long as the support is provided to per-
sons one is legally obligated to support, i.e., spouses and dependent children. See, e.g., Gould v.
Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) (judicial exclusion of support from income).
123. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (West 1996).
124. I.R.C. § 2523 (West 1996).
125. There is, of course, the anomaly that unmarried couples may fare better under the in-
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despite the fact that their economic arrangements and their commit-
ments mirror those of married couples. Consider Anna and Beth, a
committed lesbian couple, who live together. Under current law, the
production and consumption of household goods and services generally
are untaxed. Thus, when Anna cooks dinner for Beth, Beth has no
income."a Nor has Anna made a gift that is reachable by the gift
tax. '27 If, however, Anna provides monetary support for her partner in
excess of $10,000 per year, she may be required to file gift tax re-
turns." Furthermore, Anna and Beth's formation of the household
may impose tax costs. If one of them pays more for a jointly-owned
home, a taxable gift may occur. 9 If one of them retains sole owner-
ship of the home and the other pays some of the living expenses to
equal out the economic costs, then the owner may have to report some
taxable rent. 13" If the IRS were to determine that this was a rental sit-
uation, then upon sale of the home by the owner, the tax-free rollover
come tax because they are not subject to the marriage penalty that results from applying the joint
return rates to two earner couples. In addition, some code provisions penalize relationships. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 267(a) (West 1996) (forbidding loss recognition on sales between related parties.
Since unmarried couples are unrelated for tax purposes, they may take advantage of tax reduction
schemes unavailable to married couples). See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
126. One reason she has no income is that Anna offers her services as a chef as a gift, rather
than as compensation for anything. Of course, an aggressive IRS agent might argue that Anna is
exchanging her services as a chef for the services Beth provides to her. Since in the eyes of the
law, they have no legal obligation to support each other (no matter what their private contractual
obligations might be), Anna is not providing Beth with excludable support. Thus, the agent might
argue, the services are "payment" for what Anna gets back, a quid pro quo, a taxable exchange.
Although such bargained-for exchanges would be taxed if we accomplished them through a barter
club, see Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100, the IRS has not generally sought to tax such arrange-
ments between members of the same household. Furthermore, it can be argued that such instances
of in-kind personal consumption, outside of the employment context, simply do not produce tax-
able income because they do not increase "ability to pay."
127. Some might argue that the value of chef services is a gift, but within the $10,000 per
year per donee annual exclusion. See I.R.C. § 2503 (West 1996). In my opinion, there is no gift in
the first place because the gift tax is meant to apply only to transfers of property. See I.R.C.
§ 2511 (West 1996).
128. But see Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXU-
ALrY 97, 123-29 (1991) (arguing that support payments of this sort ought not to be considered
taxable gifts for gift tax purposes).
129. See 26 C.F.R. § 25.2511 -1(h)(5) (1996) (stating that creation of a joint tenancy with the
funds of one joint tenant shall be treated as a gift of 50% of the property's value to the other joint
tenant). It ought to be possible to avoid this result if there is clear evidence of intent (preferably in
writing) that the joint tenants share only in proportion to their contributions.130. If rent is paid, then part of the home becomes income-producing property. Deductions
related to the rental, including depreciation, would be authorized under I.R.C. § 212 (Law. Co-op.
1996). Those deductions, however, will be limited by I.R.C. § 280A (West 1996) which applies to
the rental of property used by the taxpayer as a personal residence.
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provisions of Section 1034 might not apply to the rented portion of the
home."' Thus, the unmarried couple is not free to arrange home own-
ership and related economic agreements regarding their living situation
without tax costs.
Functioning households create value to the state whether the
household members are married or not. For a household to function
well, its members ought to be free to arrange their economic relation-
ships within the household free from tax penalties. The tax law ques-
tion then becomes: how can we determine which households ought to
be free to arrange their economic relationships free from taxation?
Currently, marriage serves as a bright line to answer that question.
In a world without marriage, it would be possible to structure a
tax system that would recognize households. Indeed, it would be possi-
ble to recognize "tax households" with no accompanying state recogni-
tion or definition of such units. Individuals could form voluntary asso-
ciations such as partnerships and elect to be taxed as a household unit.
Who was in or out of the association would be totally a matter of
private decision. However, there is one major difficulty with this ar-
rangement. Given the opportunity for avoiding tax costs and in the
absence of any real substantive costs or responsibilities for maintaining
such a unit, individuals would be likely to form "tax households" for
the sole purpose of receiving the tax benefits.' Thus benefits would
be extended to too broad a group of units.
If groups were required to prove that they were in fact functional
households entitled to the benefits, this requirement would ameliorate
the problem. But this new requirement would create a problem of its
own: potential invasion of privacy."3 For the IRS to be certain that a
household was a "true household," evidence of how the group func-
tioned would have to be shared with the agency. If personal commit-
131. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(ii) (as amended in 1979).
132. If transfers between household members were not taxed and if value of services provided
by household members were not taxed to the persons who receive the benefits of the service, then
communes would become the tax shelters of the day. Imagine the amount of tax that could be
saved if 20 people elected to be a household and one of them (a carpenter) agreed to take care of
all house repairs and another (a chef) agreed to cook all meals and another (a millionaire) agreed
to provide all necessary supplies and materials and others agreed to provide child care, legal ser-
vices, medical services, etc.
133. Absent marriage, a couple has to prove that they are committed, that they are family in a
real and substantial sense. See Braschi v. Stahl Ass'n., 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989). And to do this re-
quires the couple to make public many things that couples would prefer to keep private. See Bruce
C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy, Balancing The
Individual and Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 463, 487 (1983).
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ment, love and affection, as opposed to mutually beneficial economic
arrangements, were the tests for establishing a "true household," the
problem would become even more obvious. The image of the Internal
Revenue Service inquiring into the amount of love and affection pres-
ent in a household is not an attractive proposition. Bright line defimi-
tions by the state reduce this problem.
Tax law ought to facilitate the formation of beneficial households.
Decisions about how those households should be formed ought to be
left up to the individuals involved. At the same time, the state will
benefit from a bright line test such as marriage to determine which
households ought to be left alone by the tax law. The state will benefit
for-the same reasons identified in the prior section: using marriage as a
bright line will create efficiency gains and avoid privacy costs. Further-
more, marriage works as a bright line for tax purposes because it car-
ries with it "substantial economic effect."'" Thus, state recognition of
marriage, or of some similar legal institution, works well for a state
that wishes to reduce tax burdens on personal decisions regarding
household formation.
Recognition of adult committed relationships within the world of
federal tax benefits the state in other ways as well. In a world of pro-
gressive tax, high bracket taxpayers will search for ways to shift in-
come to lower bracket taxpayers who share the same household. Alter-
natively, low bracket taxpayers will search for ways to shift deductions
to higher bracket taxpayers. Income shifting is possible between indi-
vidual taxpayers so long as the transaction is more than a gratuitous
assignment of income.'35 In addition, individual taxpayers can struc-
ture gains and losses between them so as to take advantage of the time
value of money."
134. "Substantial economic effect" is a tax term in the realm of partnerships. Special alloca-
tions of partnership gain and loss will not be recognized for tax purposes unless they have "sub-
stantial economic effect." See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1994). Simply put,
the tax law will not recognize mere paper transactions because two people have agreed that tax
benefits and burdens ought to be allocated in a certain way. The transaction must have economic
substance. Marriage serves as a transaction with economic substance because spouses, once mar-
ried, truly have new and different legal responsibilities and liabilities.
135. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (refusing to recognize husband's gratuitous as-
signment of salary to wife for tax purposes).
136. For example, A can sell Blackacre to B on the installment method with payment to occur
in ten years. In that event, A will recognize no gain until the deferred payment is made. B will
have a cost basis equal to the agreed-upon purchase price. Thus, B can sell to C immediately for
cash at no gain. If A and B are members of the same household, this deal would allow them to
realize a taxable gain without paying taxes until year ten. Because of the potential for abuse, Con-
gress amended the installment sales provisions to require A to recognize gain upon B's sale to C,
QLR
HeinOnline  -- 16 QLR 58 1996-1997
IMAGINE THERE'S NO MARRIAGE
Current tax law recognizes the potential for manipulation of tax
results when transactions occur between related parties. Examples in-
clude the special rule for installment sales between related parties,3
the nonrecognition of loss when sales occur between related parties, 3
the conversion of all gain to ordinary income when a taxpayer sells
depreciable property to a related party, 39 and special rules dealing
with family partnerships"4 and family-controlled corporations. 4 By
contrast, unmarried couples, no matter how committed and no matter
how much they operate as a single economic unit are untouched by
these rules.
When government interacts with taxpayers, it ought to recognize
the reality of their lives. Government's failure to recognize personal
relationships can be costly in the sort of income tax system we current-
ly have. For example, when the tax law ignores the fact that there are
many committed and financially entwined same-sex couples and
thereby treats such taxpayers as though they were unrelated persons
bargaining at arm's length, such treatment can actually result in losses
to the treasury. As a general principle, failure to conform tax law to the
realities of life will produce unnecessary inefficiencies.
In sum, the household is an important economic and social unit.
Thus, our tax laws should be applied to household units so that their
beneficial activities (e.g., supporting and improving its members) are
not taxed. Current law accomplishes this result for some households,
depending on the marital status of its members. Marriage as we know
it could be abolished and tax laws could be written to support function-
al households. But, to protect privacy concerns, some legal definition
of household unit is required. The current definition, opposite sex cou-
ples who are legally married, is too narrow to serve the state's interest
but only if A and B are related. Since unmarried couples are unrelated, they can claim this benefit.
See I.R.C. § 453(e) (West 1996).
137. See explanation supra note 136.
138. I.R.C.§ 267 (West 1996). Assume A owns property that has declined in value. A deduct-
ible loss would help reduce A's taxes for the year, but A does not really want to give up the prop-
erty because she thinks it is a good long term investment. If A sells to her lesbian partner B, she
can recognize the loss, but the property is still held within the economic unit of A and B. If A and
B were married, § 267 would prohibit recognition of the loss.
139. I.R.C.§ 1239 (West 1996). The point of this provision is to prevent A from selling capi-
tal gains property to B and paying the lower capital gains rate, in exchange for B's ability to
claim depreciation deductions against ordinary income on the stepped-up basis.
140. See I.R.C. § 704(e) (West 1996).
141. See I.R.C. § 318 (West 1996) which treats stock owned by family members as construc-
tively owned by other family members for purposes such as determining when a stockholder has
fully or substantially cashed out of a corporation.
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in facilitating functioning households. It is also too narrow to protect
the state against manipulation of the tax rules. The definition of house-
hold could and should be tailored to fit the facts of the tax regime as
well as to support the type of household units that are valuable to the
state. At the very least, this household unit ought to include same-sex
couples who are willing to commit to each other and provide support
for each other in the same way that opposite-sex married couples do.
V. CONCLUSION
State recognition of married couples is not constitutionally re-
quired because marriage implicates positive liberties. The liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause is a negative liberty. Protection of
intimacy, a negative right, is constitutionally required. But the Constitu-
tion can and does protect intimacies beyond those of married couples.
Thus, marriage is not a constitutionally required prerequisite to protec-
tion of intimacy.
Although we can imagine a world without marriage in which
couples negotiate their own contracts and courts determine default rules
on a case by case basis, such a world would create efficiency and pri-
vacy costs. Thus, state recognition of adult committed relationships is
good public policy. Whether the current institution of marriage, with its
presumptions about how most couples arrange their affairs and its
exclusion of committed same-sex couples, is the best way to accom-
plish the social and economic goals of the state is a debatable question.
This essay has attempted to shift the focus from what is good for the
couple to what is good for the state. From the state's perspective, cou-
ples that benefit the state ought to be accorded legal recognition so that
their relationships can be protected and supported. Marriage as a bright
line test for determining which couples to protect and support is both
over and under-inclusive. Thus, either marriage ought to be redefined
or the state ought to recognize new legal relationships in addition to
marriage. In either case, state recognition of adult couples ought to
include same-sex, as well as opposite sex, couples.
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